

















SERIE DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 
No. 71 
Septiembre 2009 
INTERNATIONAL PROPAGATION OF SHOCKS:  
AN EVALUATION OF CONTAGION EFFECTS FOR SOME 





Constanza Martínez   2
International propagation of shocks:  





Universidad del Rosario 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we analyze the spread of shocks across assets markets in eight 
Latin-American countries. First, we measure the extent of markets reactions 
with the Principal Components Analysis. And second, we investigate the 
volatility of assets markets based in ARCH-GARCH models in function of the 
principal components retained in the first stage. Our results do not support the 
existence of financial contagion, but of interdependence in most of the cases 
and a slight increase in the sensibility of markets to recent shocks. 
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1.  Introduction 
The international trade, financial markets relations and decisions of investors constitute the 
main transmission channels of shocks, because these means imply capital movements 
across countries. All shocks: regional or domestic affect the assets markets in different 
magnitudes. According to Forbes and Rigobon (2000) if the market’s reaction in a country 
after the occurrence of a shock in another country is extreme, that market is experiencing 
financial contagion. But if the reaction is smooth and is linked to the evolution of the 
macroeconomic fundamentals of that country, is a case of interdependence. 
 
The spread of financial contagion is attributable to the decisions of investors. Once an 
assets market is negatively affected by shocks, the investors move their money to other   3
countries or markets that under their criteria have not been affected yet; their decisions 
contribute, in such a way, to the spread of financial contagion or to the deepening of its 
consequences across countries and assets markets. 
 
The transmission of shocks is not related to the level of development of the countries. 
However, since the emerging countries seem more sensitive to its effects, the literature has 
devoted huge efforts to the understanding of these types of cases. Most of the research in 
this line is focused in the consequences of shocks that affected Asian and Latin American 
countries, between 1994 and the end of the 90s (Calvo and Reinhart 1996, Rigobon 1999, 
Kaminksy and Reinhart 2003, Edwards and Susmel 2001, Hashimoto and Ito 2004). Since 
then, several financial events have occurred and have not been explored yet. 
 
In this paper we investigate the assets markets reactions in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela to shocks that occurred between the end of 
the 90s and September of 2008. However, we do not evaluate the global financial crisis that 
emerged in 2007 because the crisis and most of its consequences have not come yet to an 
end. That is our period of study starts in 1997 and ends with the Lehman Brother’s collapse. 
 
In order to capture the behaviour of assets markets, we consider daily data of exchange rate, 
short term interest rate, equity market returns and sovereign spreads. First, we consider the 
effects of shocks to the variability of assets markets by using the Principal Components 
Analysis. Second, we investigate the volatility of each market with ARCH-GARCH models 
based on the principal components retained in the initial stage. Our results do not support 
the existence of financial contagion; but suggest interdependence across assets markets.   4
Besides, we found extreme cases of assets markets isolated of the region trends represented 
by Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the most relevant findings of financial 
contagion; Section 3 describes data set and the included exogenous shocks. Section 4 
presents the empirical tests and comments on the most important results associated to the 
Principal Components Analysis and ARCH –GARCH models. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Contagion Empirical Literature 
The propagation of shocks across countries and assets markets may end in financial 
contagion or in interdependence, according to the extent of the reaction displayed by the 
markets. Forbes and Rigobon (2000) affirm that the first case is represented by a significant 
increase in cross market linkages after the occurrence of a shock, which can not be 
explained by the evolution of the domestic macroeconomic fundamentals. So that, if the 
assets market’s reaction is extreme represents financial contagion, but if that reaction is 
smooth and is attributable to the economy’s fundamentals, represents interdependence. 
 
The financial contagion is associated to the evaluation of particular events, which in most 
cases are related to shocks with perverse effects on economies, such as the currency crises 
and government’s debt default (Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz 1996, Baig and Goldfajn 
1998, 2000, Bazdresch and Werner 2000). Several types of shocks may affect the capital 
markets, but the spread of its effects across countries appear from the generalized loss of 
confidence of international investors in the stability of assets markets. As stated by Calvo   5
and Mendoza (1998) and Agenor and Aizenman (1997) in response to a negative shock, the 
investors withdraw their money from the assets markets of the region, without confirming 
whether the market where they have invested has been affected or not by that shock. 
According to these authors and to Dornbusch, Park and Claessens (2000), investors’ 
incorrect decisions may induce to irrational movements of capitals, partially attributable to 
asymmetries of information and the lack of specific data of the country where they 
invested. The decisions of investors may create financial contagion in countries not 
infected, or deepen its consequences in countries previously affected by shocks. 
 
Within the type of shocks that conduct to financial contagion, the effects of currency crises 
have been widely explored in the empirical literature. The Mexican Tequila effect in 1994, 
the Asian currency crisis in 1997, the Russian devaluation in 1998, the Brazilian 
devaluation in 1999 and the Turkish devaluation in 2001; and the way in which those 
shocks affected other economies have been the centre of research (Eichengreen et al 1996, 
Agenor et al 1997, Glick and Rose 1998, Kodres and Pritsker 1999, Rigobon 1999, 
Kaminsky and Reinhart 2000a, 2001, Pritsker 2000, Bazdresch and Werner 2000, Forbes et 
al 2000, Baig et al 2000, Bordo and Murshid 2000, and Fazio 2007). These studies coincide 
in that financial contagion is not a global trend. The propagation of shocks goes from the 
infected country toward those economies connected by trade or financial relations. 
 
The financial contagion does not affect all countries in a similar fashion, not even to those 
with similar levels of development or economic conditions. In this matter the empirical 
literature that has included the role played by restrictions to capitals mobility, has not come 
to a definitive conclusion. For Edwards (1999) and Fazio (2007) the adoption of capital   6
controls policies in the Chilean economy, between 1990s and the end of that decade, 
avoided the consequences of Asian contagion and some Latin American crises that affected 
other countries in the region. But other studies, including a broad set of countries (De 
Gregorio and Valdés (2000) and Kaminsky et al (2001)) and specifically for Colombia 
(Concha, Galindo and Quevedo, 2008) suggest that capital controls did not stop the 
appreciation of the domestic currency and the foreign capital inflows in the end of 90’s. 
 
 
3.  Data and Financial events to be tested 
We use daily data of four assets market variables. The first variable is the exchange rate 
which accounts for the economy’s strength related to other countries and is measured by the 
percentage changes of domestic currency per U.S dollar. For the money market we include 
the short term interest rate, represented by the overnight interbank interest rate (in most of 
the countries) in order to capture the domestic monetary policy. In third place we analyze 
the equities returns on assets markets by calculating the percentage changes of the stock 
market index per country. And finally, we include the sovereign bond spreads represented 
by the Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI), to analyze the perceived risk among 
international investors. This index represents the excess of return related to the U.S treasury 
bonds that emerging countries should offer when trading its debt in international markets. 
 
Our sample is composed by seven Latin-American countries, with data from January 1
st of 
1997 to September 30
th of 2008, but with small differences in the availability of 
information per markets. In holidays and banking days we include the same data registered 
in the preceding day, so that there are no gaps in the country’s assets markets series. The   7
countries we include are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela and 
Uruguay. For this last country the only information available were the exchange rate and 
the overnight interbank interest rate. Other countries such as Panama and Dominican 
Republic were excluded, because of the lack of a formal Stock Exchange Market and the 
adoption of the U.S dollar as the domestic currency. For this last reason, we also exclude 
Ecuador, besides the fact that this country does not report data of short term interest rate. 
 
The tests of the spread of shocks among countries are based on four negative financial 
episodes and four positives. The negatives are: NASDAQ crisis, Turkish devaluation, 
Argentinean devaluation and sovereign debt default, and the Brazilian confidence crisis in 
2002. The positives shocks are the debt’s upgrade of Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Brazil. 
We do not include other events previous to the mentioned above, like: the Mexican Tequila 
effect, Russian debt default, Asian crisis, and Brazilian devaluation, because Colombian 
data on equity markets and sovereign spreads are not available for that period. The data of 
Colombian stock market prior to July of 2001 depend on three markets indexes for the 
biggest cities (Bogotá, Medellin and Cali). Each market index is composed by different 
assets baskets and reflects differences in the volumes traded; and that do not allow us to 
construct a single index for the country. In relation to the variable that captures Colombian 




In order to provide information related to the shocks, we summarize the events as follows: 
 
                                                 
1 JPMorgan register Colombian Bonds data after 1997. Brady Bonds information exists only for countries that 
developed an internal debt restructuration; and Colombia did not develop any change in this area.   8
•  Nasdaq crisis in April 2000: this index reflects the evolution of equities associated 
to the internet, telecommunications and computer software and hardware. As 
summarized by Johansen and Sornette (2000) in the spring season of 1997 this 
index experienced a speculative bubble, as a result of the generalized expectations 
of increasing future earnings, and not by the strengthening of the U.S economic 
fundamentals. The Nasdaq crisis exploded three years later, in the mid of April of 
2000, when the index lost around 40% of its market value. 
 
•  Turkish devaluation: By the end of the 90’s the monetary indicators of this country 
were characterized by a high interest rates and high inflation. The monetary 
authorities, with the purpose to control this situation, adopted a fixed exchange rate 
in December of 1999. However, since the exchange rate value at which the 
domestic currency was tied to the U.S dollar was overestimated, the productive 
sector had to face huge increases in the costs of inputs. As a result, the economy 
suffered a strong fall in the total exports that induced to an increase in the deficit of 
the balance of payments. That deficit was also enlarged by the outflows of foreign 
capitals that the country underwent since the year 2000. The final outcome: a 30% 
depreciation of the Turkish lira’s in February 22 of 2001 (Hristov, 2002). 
 
•  Argentinean debt default and devaluation: Before the end of the 90's the 
government pushed the banks and retirement funds to buy and maintain papers of 
public debt denominated in US currency, in order to finance its expenditure. But the 
population's negative expectations concerning the exchange rate and the public debt   9
management started to mine the economy’s stability in 2001. The generalized loss 
of confidence in the economy generated a massive withdrawal of savings and funds 
of the financial system that accounted for a 20% fall of total deposits during that 
year. The situation became even more complex in November of 2001 with the 
liquidity restrictions adopted by the government, such as: i) the restriction of the 
monthly withdrawals to a maximum of US$1,000 per client; ii) the change of the 
sovereign debt papers previously acquired by banks, with papers with no liquidity, 
so that their value became a direct credit to the government; iii) the imposition of 
ceilings to the deposits interest rates. The economic instability was magnified by the 
declaration of debt default in the end of December of 2001, and deepened a month 
later when the government devaluated its domestic currency in 290% (CLAF 2002). 
 
•  Confidence crisis in Brazil (Mineiro 2002): During 1994 the government adopted 
some economic measures with the purpose of liberalize the trade and financial 
relations. These policies were based in the increase of domestic investment and 
public expenditure mostly financed with foreign capitals inflows. The economy 
worked reasonably well until 1998, right after the liquidity problems emerged in 
response to a strong capital outflows. The situation worsened in January of 1999 
since the country was forced to conduct a strong devaluation of its domestic 
currency (the Real); and became even critical by the end of 2001, when its main 
trade partner: Argentina, did enter in debt default. During these years the economy 
exhibited an increasing internal and external debt that continued to grow, reaching 
60% of GDP in July of 2002. Almost 30% of the public debt was tied to the US 
currency so that, the increase in devaluation pushed up the value of its external debt.   10
In July of 2002 the confidence crisis emerged, also augmented by the dominance of 
the candidate Lula Da Silva in the presidential elections. 
 
•  Debts ratings upgrades: the Mexican debt was elevated by Moody’s agency to the 
investment grade in March 7
th of 2000. The Colombian and Brazilian debt were 
taken to the BBB- level by Standard and Poor’s (which corresponds to investment 
grade), in June 12 of 2007 and April 30 of 2008, respectively. The Peruvian credit 
rating was also upgraded in April 2 of 2008 by the Fitch Agency. 
 
 
4.  Empirical tests 
Our empirical tests for financial contagion consist of two procedures. We first investigate 
the evolution of assets markets with the Principal Components Analysis (PCA) for the 
entire sample and for each sub-sample in the eight financial episodes. For these sub-
samples we define periods before and after shocks, omitting the time during which each 
one took place. Otherwise, our results could incorrectly determine the existence of financial 
contagion. In a second stage we analyze the volatility of markets based in ARCH-GARCH 
models, obtained from the PCA's retained components. 
 
Before conducting PCA we standardized all variables in order to prevent that differences in 
the variances of the series generate distortions in our results (Kaminsky et al 2001 
employed the same standardization, ensuring that all variables have zero mean and unit 
standard deviation). Therefore we confirm that the PCA is a suitable method to study the 
sensibility of assets markets by means of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin statistic (KMO), which is   11
an index that compares the magnitudes of the observed correlation coefficients with the 
partial correlation coefficients. The higher the result of this statistic the stronger is the 
relationship of assets markets among countries.  
 
Table 1 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure (KMO), after shocks 
NASDAQ crisis Mexico's debt upgrade
exchange rate 0.73 exchange rate 0.73
overnight interest rate 0.64 overnight interest rate 0.73
equities 0.81 equities 0.81
EMBI 0.85 EMBI 0.85
Turkish devaluation Colombia's debt upgrade
exchange rate 0.74 exchange rate 0.73
overnight interest rate 0.69 overnight interest rate 0.80
equities 0.81 equities 0.86
EMBI 0.85 EMBI 0.93
Argentina's debt default Peru's debt upgrade
exchange rate 0.74 exchange rate 0.72
overnight interest rate 0.62 overnight interest rate 0.83
equities 0.81 equities 0.82
EMBI 0.86 EMBI 0.91
Brazilian confidence crisis Brazil's debt upgrade
exchange rate 0.73 exchange rate 0.73
overnight interest rate 0.74 overnight interest rate 0.86
equities 0.82 equities 0.81
EMBI 0.87 EMBI 0.90  
Calculations of the authors 
 
Our results of KMO in Table 1 validate the PCA procedure with statistics that surpass the 
critical bound of 0.60, required to consistently apply this procedure. In other words, the 
markets reactions of these Latin-American countries after shocks are closely connected.  
 
 
a.  Principal components analysis (PCA)  
The PCA is a method of data reduction that is linear in variables and produces a smaller 
number of new non-correlated variables that explain most of the original series variances. 
The procedure consists in the decomposition of the series into its Eigen-vectors and Eigen-
values from the correlation matrix of the variables. The Eigen-vectors (factors loadings) in   12
absolute value represent the strength of co-movement of each country with respect to other 
Latin-American countries (LAC). 
 
In the study of assets markets behaviour the first principal component can be considered as 
indicator of regional risk because it measures the degree of common movement displayed 
by markets. In such a way, the percentage of variance explained by this component 
measures the markets' reaction after shocks. According to Fuentes and Godoy (2005) if the 
percentage of variance surpasses 50% the assets markets are displaying an extreme 
coupling, suggesting financial contagion. A lower reaction, in between 35-50%, 
corresponds to markets with a strong coupling, which support the existence of 
interdependence. And percentages below 35% imply a weak coupling, a common result of 
markets disconnected of the regional trends. 
 
Our results identify differences in the consequences of shocks among countries and assets 
markets (Table 2). From the thresholds proposed by Fuentes and Godoy (2005) we 
recognize few cases of extreme coupling but not very conclusive in relation to the existence 
of contagion. The majority of our eigen-vectors suggest that assets markets co-movements 
reflect interdependence; and few specific results display no transmission of shocks at all. 
 
In the exchange rate market the largest extent of co-movement is explained by Brazil, with 
factor loadings that surpass 0.50 in all events, however percentages are not far from the 
middle threshold. These results of Brazil are slightly followed by Mexico, Chile and 
Colombia. But, the Chilean exchange rate increases only after the occurrence of negative 
shocks. The Colombian exchange rate reacts in a strong fashion when shocks are positive.   13
These differences should be taken carefully, since in all countries the government sudden 
interventions impede that domestic currencies freely float, and this fact may bias the tests 
of exchange rates. Some severe cases of this type of interventions are represented by 
Argentina and Venezuela, with currencies that have been fixed to the U.S dollar. Our 
results confirm this situation, with a very low proportion of the variance explained by the 
first component for both countries. At least for the domestic currencies markets, the factor 
loadings results do not support the existence of financial contagion, but of interdependence. 
 
In relation to the short term interest rate the greatest extent of co-movement is presented by 
Chile, Colombia and Peru; an outcome that may be attributable to similarities in: its short 
term monetary policy or the foreign capitals inflows trends that each country receives. In 
either of these alternatives the money markets responses to shocks (though high) only 
reflects interdependence. In the other extreme we found the Argentinean and Venezuelan 
interest rates, with factor loadings very close to zero. In such a way, the exchange rate 
results along with the overnight interest rate suggest that the markets of both countries are 
not correlated with the other countries of the region. 
 
In the markets of equities we distinguish two different types: strong coupling markets 
(evidencing interdependence) and markets isolated of the region's trends. In the first 
category we found Brazil, Chile and Mexico as the markets that display the highest extent 
of reaction to shocks: positives or negatives. At least for the case of Brazil this outcome 
could be associated with a foreign portfolio investment in equities that averaged an increase 
of 145.9% between 2002 and 2006, according to the IMF statistics. Argentina follows the 
trend displayed by this first group, but its reactions are particularly high in response to   14
recent positive shocks. In the second group we found the markets of Colombia and 
Venezuela. The factor loadings of Colombian stocks exchange display weak couplings with 
the rest of LAC. Calvo and Reinhart (1996) found the same result for this country and that 
is very intuitive since the behaviour of this market mostly depends on the decisions of 
domestic investors. The Venezuelan case exhibited the lowest factor loadings of the group 
which imply that the international shocks do not generate large effects in this market. 
 
 
Table 2 Principal Components Analysis after shocks 
Factor Loadings by Country 
0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.37 0.39 0.40
Argentina 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.19
Brazil 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.50
Chile 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.38 0.32 0.33
Colombia 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.48 0.44 0.44
Mexico 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48
Peru 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.26 0.30 0.28 0.28
Uruguay 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.20 0.32 0.32
Venezuela 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
0.40 0.34 0.34 0.38 0.46 0.57 0.61 0.62
Argentina -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.22 0.44 -0.09 0.07 -0.13
Brazil -0.20 -0.45 -0.35 0.46 -0.40 0.37 0.44 0.43
Chile 0.48 0.49 0.48 -0.41 0.48 0.45 0.44 0.43
Colombia 0.49 0.51 0.52 -0.48 0.41 0.44 0.42 0.42
Mexico 0.46 0.07 0.33 0.06 0.04 0.44 0.44 0.44
Peru 0.50 0.47 0.47 -0.40 0.48 0.40 0.44 0.44
Uruguay -0.12 -0.22 -0.18 0.33 -0.10 0.31 0.09 0.09
Venezuela -0.08 -0.13 -0.08 0.25 0.00 -0.13 -0.20 -0.21
0.38 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.55 0.51 0.52
Argentina 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.42 0.44 0.47 0.47
Brazil 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.44 0.46 0.47
Chile 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.37 0.36
Colombia 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.32
Mexico 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.42 0.44 0.44
Peru  0.36 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.39 0.36 0.37
Venezuela 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.01 -0.02
0.43 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.49 0.75 0.73 0.74
Argentina 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.38 0.37 0.38
Brazil 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.42 0.43 0.43
Chile 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.04 0.04
Colombia 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.42 0.43 0.42
Mexico 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.41 0.41 0.41
Peru  0.43 0.43 0.44 0.46 0.44 0.41 0.42 0.42
Venezuela 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.39
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The sovereign debt spreads exhibit small reactions to the shocks evaluated. With exception 
of Chile, the remaining countries evidence strong coupling with factor loadings that vary 
among 0.40 and 0.48 which point interdependence. The responses of Colombia, Mexico 
and Peru are stronger after a negative shock, suggesting a higher sensibility to bad news. In 
the other extreme is Chile, a country that displays the lowest sovereign risk, in contrast to 
the other countries in the sample. For this outcome we propose two explanations. First, 
foreign investment in Chile is more stable than that registered in other LAC. And second, 
the stability and faultless management that the Chilean government has made of its 
domestic public debt. Recently, the Standard and Poor’s agency conferred the (AA
+) rating, 
which corresponds to a country with very strong capacity to repay its sovereign debt.  
 
In the graphs below we present the proportion explained by the first two principal 
components per assets market. For more recent shocks, especially for those that occurred 
after the beginning of 2000, the sensibility displayed by the first principal component is 
increasing and rapidly approximate to the limit of extreme coupling. However, the assets 
markets reactions also coincide with shocks originated in the Latin-American region.  
 
Graphs 1 Assets markets sensibility to shocks  
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Calculations of the authors 
 
Even though the equity markets and exchange rates display a slight increase in the 
sensibility to shocks, our results support the existence of interdependence in all period. The 
short term interest rate and the sovereign debt spreads have also been linked to their region 
counterparts by interdependence. However, both markets have been experiencing increases 
in the sensibility, especially as response to positive and recent shocks. 
 
 
b.  ARCH and GARCH models 
In this stage we calculate the volatility models with the components retained from the PCA 
procedure. These models are appropriate to study the dynamics of assets markets because 
allow us to remove the excess of kurtosis present in most of our data. Besides, as suggested 
by Forbes and Rigobon (2000), evaluations of financial contagion with traditional tests in 
presence of heteroscedasticity may generate biased results in favour of financial contagion
2. 
 
                                                 
2 In previous estimations we use VAR models and its results signalled the presence of ARCH effect in the 
error terms. In order to correct this problem we opted for volatility models, which also allowed us to obtain 
consistent and efficient estimators. 
 
   17
According to Bollerslev (1990) the formal representation for a GARCH(1,1) is given by: 
 
(2)                






















In the equation (1)  t r  is the jth principal component obtained in the first stage, which also 
denotes the returns of the assets market and the second term ( t ε ) is the conditional mean 
residual of random shocks. The equation (2) represents the conditional variance of stock 
returns over time.  
 
Our results fulfil the necessary condition to correctly analyze the volatility spreads among 
markets, which is that the standardized residuals are not serially correlated. In the last 
column of Table 3 we present the results for this ARCH test
3.  
 
Concerning to the conditional variance equation, the alpha (α) coefficients measure the 
extent of reaction to shocks while the bethas (β) capture the persistence of volatility. Per 
type of markets, the calculated alphas suggest that the overnight interest rates exhibit a 
marked strong reaction to shocks. Our estimators for Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and 
Peru exceeded the unity, while for Brazil and Chile these coefficients tended to 0.6. 
However, the persistence in volatility for all of these markets is extremely low implying 
that the effects of shocks on the assets markets eventually disappear.  
 
                                                 
3 The ARCH effect is tested by the product of the number of observations and the R
2 coefficient.   18
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We also carry out a similar analysis for the remaining markets and it produced the opposite 
result: a small reaction to shocks with high volatility persistence. Some examples are 
provided by the stock exchange markets of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, which 
imply that the effects of shocks are weak but may generate long lasting consequences.  
 
Per type of shocks, we found differences in the assets markets sensibility to specific shocks. 
Following the same methodology used by Kaminsky et al (2002) we classify the dates with 
the highest increase in the conditional variance (graphs in the appendix). Our results point 
that the turbulences in the markets were stronger after the Brazilian devaluation (in January 
13 of 1999) and the Argentinean debt default (in the second half of 2001). The first of these 
shocks affected the equity markets of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela. 
Whereas the second altered the sovereign bond spreads of Argentina, Chile, Colombia and 
Mexico, the Mexican exchange rate and the interbank interest rate of Argentina and Peru. 
 
Concerning to the remaining shocks we identify a moderate reaction of Colombia, Mexico 
and Brazil’s in 2002 that coincides with the Brazilian confidence crisis that ended with the 
election of President Lula. 
 
Our results also reveal that the sensibility to shocks vary from market to market, 
presumably by differences in the liquidity and the type of investors that acquire the assets. 
In this outcome we coincide with Kaminsky et al (2001) in that the assets markets are not 
equally affected by shocks. If assets markets are more open and attract huge amounts of 
foreign capitals, its sensibility to shocks should be higher. But if markets mainly depend on 
domestic investments, its sensibility to shocks will be lower or null. According to the   21
International Monetary Fund, the foreign portfolio investment in equities between 2001 and 
2008 reached a cumulative average as percentage of GDP in 2008 of 0.55% in Argentina, 
2.69% in Brazil, 2.03% in Chile, 0.34% in Colombia, (-0.04%) in Mexico, 1.51% in Peru 
and 0.03% in Venezuela. The Brazilian equity market which was the main receptor of 
foreign capitals in Latin America, is precisely the market that exhibit the strongest reactions 
to different sorts of shocks. The opposite occurs in Argentina which equity market barely 
responds to shocks. 
 
Our results suggest that the markets display higher sensibility to positive and recent shocks. 
We identify strong market’s reactions in most of Latin American countries in response to 
the debt’s upgrade of Colombia, Peru and Brazil. Besides, we found stronger reactions to 
shocks originated regionally in contrast to shocks coming from non Latin-American 
countries. For example, the effects of the Turkish’s devaluation were not significant as 
shown by our outcomes.  
 
 
5.  Conclusions  
The international transmission of shocks across countries ends in financial contagion if the 
assets markets reaction is extreme and can not be associated to the fundamentals of the 
economy. The spread and consequences of this financial phenomenon are tied to the 
decisions of international investors which may be wrong, if asymmetries of information 
related to the country where they have invested are present.  
   22
Our two step procedure for testing the transmission of shocks clearly identifies the 
existence of interdependence across assets markets in Latin American countries. Per type of 
markets there is no conclusive evidence of financial contagion, however the sensibility to 
shocks have been increasing, especially in the cases of the interbank overnight interest rate 
and sovereign bond spreads; and also in response to the occurrence of positives and recent 
shocks originated in Latin American countries. 
 
We found few cases but not very conclusive of the existence of financial contagion, mostly 
related to the exchange rate behaviour in Brazil. We also found that the exchange rates and 
overnight interest rates of Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela are not related to the regional 
trends so that their markets reactions to shocks are negligible. Per type of markets the 
volatility models suggest small reactions to shocks with high persistence in the assets 
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